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ABSTRACT
Blockchain protocols differ in fundamental ways, including theme-
chanics of selecting users to produce blocks (e.g., proof-of-work vs.
proof-of-stake) and themethod to establish consensus (e.g., longest
chain rules vs. BFT-inspired protocols). These fundamental differ-
ences have hindered “apples-to-apples” comparisons between dif-
ferent categories of blockchain protocols and, in turn, the develop-
ment of theory to formally discuss their relative merits.
This paper presents a parsimonious abstraction sufficient for
capturing and comparing properties of many well-known permis-
sionless blockchain protocols, simultaneously capturing essential
properties of both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake protocols, and
of both longest-chain-type and BFT-type protocols.Our framework
blackboxes the precise mechanics of the user selection process, al-
lowing us to isolate the properties of the selection process which
are significant for protocol design.
We illustrate our framework’s utility with two results. First, we
prove an analog of the CAP theorem from distributed computing
for our framework in a partially synchronous setting. This theo-
rem shows that a fundamental dichotomy holds between proto-
cols (such as Bitcoin) that are adaptive, in the sense that they can
function given unpredictable levels of participation, and protocols
(such as Algorand) that have certain finality properties. Second, we
formalize the idea that proof-of-work (PoW) protocols and non-
PoW protocols can be distinguished by the forms of permission
that users are given to carry out updates to the state.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation;
KEYWORDS
blockchains, cryptocurrencies, distributed computing, CAP theo-
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1 INTRODUCTION
The task of a permissionless blockchain protocol is to establish con-
sensus for message ordering over a network of users. This job is
made difficult by the fact that, being subject to the laws of physics,
the underlying communication networkmust have latency, i.e. broad-
cast messages will necessarily take time to travel over the network
of users. As a consequence of this latency, malicious users may
purposely cause the order in which messages are first seen to be
different for different honest users, and some differences in order-
ing will anyway be an honest consequence of varying propagation
times between different nodes of the network [9].
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Network latency is especially problematic when we work at
the level of individual transactions, which may be produced at a
rate which is high compared to network latency. For this reason
it is standard practice to collect transactions together into blocks,
which can then be produced at a rate which is much lower com-
pared to network latency. Given that we are working in a permis-
sionless setting, the basic question then becomes, “Who should
produce the blocks?”. This question is answered differently by dif-
ferent protocols. Three running examples, which we shall use for
reference in this paper, are:
• Bitcoin;
• Snow White;
• Algorand.
Of course, Bitcoin [16] is the best known proof-of-work (PoW)
protocol, and is also a longest chain protocol. This means that forks
may occur in the blockchain, but that honest miners will build on
the longest chain. At a high level, Snow White [1] might be seen
as a proof-of-stake (PoS) version of Bitcoin – it is also a longest
chain protocol, but now miners are selected with probability pro-
portional to their stake in the currency, rather than their hashing
power. We use Algorand [8] as an example of a ‘BFT’ protocol.1
This means that users are selected, and asked to carry out a con-
sensus protocol designed for the permissioned setting. So users are
not only asked to produce blocks, but also other objects, such as
votes on blocks. Algorand is also a PoS protocol.
Such fundamental differences between competing blockchain
protocols have hindered “apples-to-apples” comparisons between
them, and a majority of the research-to-date has focused on the
analysis of specific protocols (or narrow classes of protocols). Our
goal here is to complement existing work on protocol-specific anal-
ysis with a mathematical framework for formally discussing the
relative merits of protocols of very different types.
The first and main aim of this paper is to develop amodel for the
analysis of permissionless blockchain protocols that blackboxes
the precise mechanics of the user selection process, allowing us to
isolate the properties of the selection process that are significant,
and to make comparisons between blockchain protocols of differ-
ent types. Section 2 describes a framework of this kind, according
to which protocols run relative to a resource pool. This resource
pool specifies a balance for each user over the duration of the pro-
tocol execution (such as hashrate or stake), which may be used in
determining which users are permitted to make publications up-
dating the state.
1By ‘BFT protocols’ we shall (informally) mean either: (a) Consensus protocols which
are defined in the permissioned setting in order to deal with byzantine faults, or (b)
Consensus protocols which work in the permissionless setting by importing protocols
of type (a).
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With this framework in place, we then turn our attention to con-
sider how properties of the resource pool may influence the func-
tionality of the resulting protocol. In Sections 3 and 4, we will be
concerned with the distinction between scenarios in which the size
of the resource pool is known (e.g. PoS), and scenarios where the
size of the resource pool is unknown (e.g. PoW). We refer to these
as the sized and unsized settings, respectively. We will find that the
choice of setting is intimately related to a fundamental tradeoff for
permissionless blockchain protocols, which can be viewed as an
analog of the CAP theorem from distributed computing [12] for
our framework: In a partially synchronous setting, a protocol can-
not deliver finality for block confirmations while at the same time
being adaptive, in the sense that it remains live without knowledge
of the size of the resource pool.2
In Section 5 we will examine a fundamental distinction between
PoW and non-PoW protocols, which concerns the forms of per-
mission that users are given to carry out updates to the state. We
formalize the idea that, under quite general conditions, PoW pro-
tocols are distinguished by their ability to allow the broadcast of
specific blocks (and other objects), rather than granting permission
to broadcast any object from a large class (such as any valid block
extending a given position in the blockchain). Historically, this is
one of the distinctions between PoW and PoS that has received the
most attention in the literature [2].
1.1 Finality and Adaptivity
Our main impossibility result, which appears in Section 4, con-
cerns notions of ‘finality’, ‘adaptivity’, ‘security’, and ‘liveness’. Be-
fore defining these terms, it is useful to consider how these notions
relate to another informal division that is often drawn in the cryp-
tocurrency community and in the literature [2], between ‘longest
chain’ type protocols such as Bitcoin and Snow White on the one
hand, and so called ‘BFT’ protocols such as Algorand [8] and Ten-
dermint [3] on the other.
Roughly speaking, the term ‘longest chain’ is normally applied
to protocols which are derived from Bitcoin, and which work by
having miners select a fork of the blockchain to build on, which is
defined in terms of some sort of scoring function for chains. The
selected chain might be the one with the most PoW attached, or it
might be the longest, or it might be defined by an inductive process
that counts the number of descendants, as in the GHOST protocol
[20]. BFT protocols, on the other hand, work by selecting a subset
of users and having them carry out a more traditional consensus
protocol which is defined for the permissioned setting. The terms
‘BFT’ and ‘longest chain’ are thus descriptive of where protocols
come from, but don’t yet formally define classes of protocols in a
way that allows us to analyse the differences between them and
prove results contrasting the performance of these classes of pro-
tocols in a broad sense.
The informal idea is that there is a trade-off. While BFT pro-
tocols potentially offer finality (whatever that should mean), this
comes with the price that the protocol will stall if participation lev-
els drop. In Algorand, for example, committees of users are selected
2Our impossibility result contrasts with previous works that prove positive re-
sults about the liveness and consistency properties of the Bitcoin protocol in more
strongly synchronous settings (such as synchronous networks [11] and networks with
bounded message delays [11, 13, 17, 19]).
in rounds, and block confirmation requires a certain proportion of
committee members to contribute signatures. If participation lev-
els drop to a point where insufficiently many signatures are being
produced for each block, then the process of block confirmation
will come to a standstill. Longest chain protocols such as Bitcoin,
on the other hand, do not deliver finality but are adaptive, in the
sense that they naturally adjust and remain live in the face of fluc-
tuating levels of participation.
In order to make this trade-off precise, we must decide how to
formalize ‘finality’ and ‘adaptivity’. First, let us consider finality.
To define this notion, we focus on differentiating the settings (e.g.,
the degree of assumed synchrony) in which protocols are secure,
meaning that block confirmation can be relied on. Bitcoin andmost
other longest chain-type protocols will not be considered to have
finality, because block confirmation can only be relied on assuming
the ongoing participation of a large fraction of honest users: Block
confirmation is not secure against unbounded network partitions
[17]. Algorand and most BFT-type protocols will have finality be-
cause there is essentially zero chance that confirmed blocks will be
rolled back, even in the event that honest users cease to participate
after the block has been confirmed, e.g. due to an extended period
of network failure. Section 3 formalizes this distinction and our
finality notion in terms of security in a partially synchronous set-
ting. The distinction between synchronous and partially synchro-
nous settings is standard when working with permissioned proto-
cols [10]; see Section 2 for the definitions.
Next, let us consider adaptivity. Recall that, according to our
framework, protocols run relative to a resource pool. This resource
pool specifies a balance for each user over the duration of the pro-
tocol execution (such as hashrate or stake), which may be used in
determining which users are permitted to make publications up-
dating the state. So Bitcoin will be modeled as running relative to
a resource pool that specifies the hashrate of each user over the du-
ration of the protocol execution, and users with greater hashrate
will be more likely to be selected for block production. In Section
3, we will formally define adaptivity in terms of the information
about the resource pool that is available to the protocol. First, we
will define the unsized setting, so as to formalize contexts in which
the total size of the resource pool is information which is not avail-
able to the protocol. With this definition in place, and once we
have formalized the notion of ‘liveness’ – roughly, liveness is the
property that with high probability the set of confirmed blockswill
grow over time – we will then be able to define adaptive protocols
as those which are live in the unsized setting.3 Adaptive protocols
are thus those which are like Bitcoin—not necessarily in an opera-
tional sense, but in the sense that they are live even when the total
size of the resource pool is unknown to the protocol.
1.2 The tradeoff between adaptivity and
finality.
With these definitions in place, we will then be able to formally
prove Theorem 4.1 below, which can be seen as an analog of the
CAP Theorem [12] from distributed computing for our framework.
3One might want a protocol to satisfy stronger notions of liveness, such as quanti-
tative lower bounds on chain growth or chain quality (as in e.g. [11, 17]). The fact
that we work with such a weak notion of liveness only strengthens our impossibility
result.
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Roughly speaking, ‘security’ in our framework corresponds to ‘atomic
consistency’ in the framework inwhich theCAPTheorem is proved
in [12], and ‘liveness’ corresponds to ‘availability’. These corre-
spondences are not exact, however. While availability requires a
response even during extended periods of asynchrony, our defini-
tion of liveness explicitly rules out the requirement that new con-
firmed blocks should be produced under such conditions. The key
observation in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that, in the unsized set-
ting, extended periods of asynchrony cannot be distinguished from
a waning resource pool. Liveness therefore forces the production
of new confirmed blocks during appropriately chosen periods of
asynchrony. Liveness and security are thus incompatible in the par-
tially synchronous and unsized setting, while the same is not true
in the partially synchronous and sized setting.
Theorem 4.1 (Impossibility Result). No protocol is both adap-
tive and has finality.
This result establishes a simple dichotomy for permissionless
blockchain protocols. A protocol can be adaptive or it can have fi-
nality, but not both. It also draws a clean and formal line between
longest chain protocols such as Bitcoin and Ethereum [4], or PoS
implementations such as Snow White [1] on the one hand, and
BFT protocols such as Algorand, Casper FFG and PoS implementa-
tions of Tendermint or Hotstuff [21] on the other.While the former
group are all adaptive, the latter group all have finality.
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from Theo-
rem 4.1 concerns PoW protocols. PoS protocols are generally best
modeled using the sized setting, while PoW protocols are generally
best modeled using the unsized setting—the total stake is typically
information which is available to a protocol from the beginning of
its execution, while the amount of computational power used to
provide PoW can vary over time in an unpredictable way. To the
extent that PoW protocols must operate in an unsized setting (and
guarantee liveness), Theorem 4.1 implies that they cannot have fi-
nality.4
1.3 Related Work
The novel feature of Bitcoin that distinguishes it from previous
consensus protocols is that it is permissionless, i.e. it establishes
consensus between a set of users that anybody can join, with as
many identities as they choose in any given role. This paper can
be seen as a step towards developing a formal framework for the
analysis of permissionless protocols akin to the extensively devel-
oped one for permissioned protocols [15]. The study of byzantine
fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols in the permissioned set-
ting dates back at least to 1980 [14, 18]. Among those BFT protocols
of interest to us here, we can distinguish two forms:
(1) The oldest relevant form of BFT protocol is aimed at solving
the ‘Byzantine Generals Problem’ [14, 18]. The task here is
to reach consensus on a single yes/no decision. In applying
these methods to the blockchain setting, one approach, as
employed by Algorand, is to run such a BFT protocol for
each in a sequence of proposed blocks, until consensus is
4The continual adjustment of the difficulty parameter in Bitcoin can be viewed as an
attempt to maintain an approximation of the sized setting in a fundamentally unsized
setting. See Section 6.2 for further discussion.
reached for each block as to whether it should be included
in the blockchain. A drawback of this approach is that posi-
tive or negative consensus has to be reached for one block at
a time. A large number of rounds of communication may be
required before agreement is reached, giving a correspond-
ing negative impact on confirmation times.
(2) Perhaps more appropriate for the blockchain setting, since
they are designed to achieve essentially the same task as per-
missionless blockchain protocols but in the permissioned
setting, are BFT protocols designed for the purpose of state
machine replication (SMR) [6, 7]. The task of such protocols
is for a set of distributed users to agree on an order of execu-
tion for an ever growing list of client-initiated service com-
mands – replace ‘client-initiated service commands’ with
‘transactions’, and this is precisely the aim of permission-
less blockchain protocols. The advantage of this approach
is that it allows for considerably simpler protocols, which
might only require two or three rounds of communication
per block.
The CAP theorem is one of the most celebrated theorems in the
distributed computing literature. The theorem proved by Gilbert
and Lynch [12] is a formal version of a conjecture due to Brewer,
which is made in the context of distributed web services. The the-
orem establishes an impossibility result: It is impossible for such
a distributed service to simultaneously achieve the three desirable
properties of consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. For
formal definitions of these terms we refer the reader to [12] and
[15]. The relationship between the CAP Theorem and Theorem 4.1
was briefly discussed in Section 1.2, and we shall expand on this
discussion in Section 4.
2 THE FRAMEWORK
2.1 Predetermined and undetermined variables
Our aim here is to establish a framework for analysing permission-
less blockchain protocols that blackboxes the precise mechanics of
the user selection process. This will allow us to prove impossibility
results, and to isolate the properties of the selection process that
are significant, in the sense that they impact the way in which the
protocol must be designed, or influence properties of the resulting
protocol (such as security in a range of settings).
In order to define properties such as liveness and security later
on, it will be convenient to consider protocols that are specified rel-
ative to a finite set of initially defined parameters. For Algorand to
run securely, for example, one must first decide how long the pro-
tocol is to run for, and then choose committee sizes accordingly.
The duration of the execution is therefore required as a parameter
of the protocol. Variables that are specified before the execution of
the protocol as parameters, or which take the same value for all ex-
ecutions of the protocol, are referred to as predetermined. Variables
(such as the number of users) that are not predetermined, will be
referred to as undetermined.
2.2 The users
We consider settings in which protocols are executed by an un-
determined set of pseudonymous users, this set being of undeter-
mined size. Each user is given access to a signature scheme, and
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controls a set of public keys by which they will be known to other
users. We use the variable U to range over users, while U will be
used to range over public keys – each user may have many public
keys. Amongst all users, there is one who is distinguished as the
adversary and who controls an undetermined set of public keys.
Users other than the adversary are referred to as honest.
We will suppose that each user is a deterministic computing de-
vice, which has amongst the actions it can perform calls to certain
oracles, as well as certain external functionalities such as the abil-
ity to broadcast messages. The protocol specifies an instruction set,
which is a program which is run by every user, other than the ad-
versary. The adversary can follow any program of their choosing.
While we might think of the set of users as forming a network
over which messages can propagate, in order to keep things as sim-
ple as possible, we shall not make the network explicit in our frame-
work. Users simply have the ability to broadcast messages. Once a
message is broadcast by a public key belonging to a given user, it
may subsequently be delivered to other users at different stages of
the execution.
2.3 Network failures
We suppose that protocols are specified to run for a predetermined
sequence of timeslots, each timeslot being of predetermined length.
The appropriate length of these timeslots depends on the protocol
to be modeled. For many PoS protocols, an appropriate length is
slightly more than the network latency, i.e. the time it takes a block
to propagate the network. (Thus, each user might carry out many
instructions during a single timeslot.) We will see that PoW pro-
tocols might be better modeled using very short timeslots. In any
case, the sequence of timeslots is called the duration D. At the be-
ginning of each timeslot in the duration, broadcast messages may
be delivered to various users. The message state relative to a given
user is the set of all broadcast messages which have been delivered
to them. The message state for a given user is therefore monotoni-
cally increasing over time. In order to be broadcast, a message must
be valid, meaning that it must have a certain structure and that cer-
tain other conditions, expanded on below, are also satisfied.
For example, if modeling Bitcoin or Snow White, a user’s mes-
sage state will be the set of (valid) blocks that have been delivered
to them. Thus the message state will not, in general, be a single
chain of blocks. For Algorand, a user’s message state will be all
those messages which have been delivered to them, which are ei-
ther valid blocks, or else the signed messages of committee mem-
bers exchanged while reaching consensus on blocks.
It is standard in the distributed computing literature to consider
a variety of synchronous, partially synchronous, or asynchronous
settings, in which users may or may not have clocks which are
almost synchronised, or run at varying speeds, and where mes-
sage delivery might be reliable or subject to various forms of fail-
ure. For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose here that users’
clocks are synchronised – while this might seem like a strong as-
sumption, this only strengthens our impossibility result. We will,
though, allow for periods of network failure, during which the ad-
versary is able to control message delivery. In order to formalize
this, we will suppose that the duration is divided into intervals that
are labelled either synchronous or asynchronous (meaning that each
timeslot is either synchronous or asynchronous). We will suppose
that, during synchronous intervals, message delivery time is proba-
bilistically distributed for each pair of users. During asynchronous
intervals, we suppose that the adversary is able to interfere with
message delivery as they choose, i.e. the adversary can leave mes-
sages to be delivered in a probabilistic fashion as normal, can cause
undelivered messages to be delivered early, or can stop messages
being delivered at all for the duration of the asynchronous inter-
val. (Though we can always assume that a message broadcast by
a user is in effect delivered instantaneously to that user.) We then
distinguish two synchronicity settings. In the synchronous setting
it is assumed that there are no asynchronous intervals during the
duration, while in the partially synchronous setting there may be
undetermined asynchronous intervals.
2.4 The structure of the blockchain
Amongst all broadcast messages, there is a distinguished set re-
ferred to as blocks, and one block which is referred to as the gene-
sis block. Unless it is the genesis block, each block B has a unique
parent block Par(B), which must be uniquely specified within the
block message. Each block is produced by a single user, Miner(B),
but may contain other broadcast messages which have been pro-
duced by other users. No block can be broadcast by U := Miner(B)
at a point strictly prior to that at which its parent has been deliv-
ered to U. Par(B) is defined to be an ancestor of B, and all of the
ancestors of Par(B) are also defined to be ancestors of B. If B is not
the genesis block, then it must have the genesis block as an ances-
tor. At any point during the duration, the set of broadcast blocks
thus forms a tree structure. If M is a message state, then we shall
say that it is downward closed if it contains the parents of all blocks
in M . By a leaf of M , we shall mean a block in M which is not a
parent of any block inM . IfM is downward closed and contains a
single leaf, then we shall say thatM is a chain.
2.5 The resource pool
Protocols are run relative to a (predetermined or undetermined)
resource pool, which in the general case is a function R : U ×D ×
M → R≥0, where U is the set of public keys, D is the duration
andM is the set of all possiblemessage states. So R can be thought
of as specifying the resource balance of each user at each timeslot
in the duration, possibly relative to a given message state. For a
PoW protocol like Bitcoin, the resource balance of each public key
will be their (relevant) computational power at the given timeslot
(which is generally independent of any message state). For PoS pro-
tocols, such as Snow White and Algorand, however, the resource
balance will be fully determined by ‘on-chain’ information, i.e. in-
formation recorded in the message state M . Generally, a chain of
blocksC ⊆ M will first be selected. SoC might be the longest chain,
or the longest chain of blocks that have been approved by commit-
tee members. Then R(U, t ,M) will be some function of U’s stake as
recorded by the blocks in C .5
5The details here will depend on the specific protocol. It’s standard to insist that a
user has had stake in the currency recorded for a certain number of timeslots before
they are allowed to produce blocks, for example. So U’s resource balance might be
their stake according to C or some initial segment of C , or else 0 if U has not been
recorded as having non-zero stake for sufficient time.
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By the total resource balance T , wemean the sum of the resource
balances of all public keys; this is the function T : D×M → R≥0
defined by T (t ,M) =
∑
U R(U, t ,M). It should be noted that the
resource pool is a variable, meaning that a given protocol may be
expected to be live and secure with respect to a range of resource
pools.
2.6 The sized and unsized settings
Just as we considered two synchronicity settings earlier, we also
consider two resource settings. The basic idea is that in the sized set-
ting, the total resource balance is information which is available to
the protocol (and the permitter, as described in Section 2.7), while
in the unsized setting it is not. The precise details are as follows.
The unsized setting. For the unsized setting, R (and hence T ) is
undetermined, with the only restrictions being:
(1) R will be a function fromU×D ×M to R≥0 satisfying the
requirement that, at all timeslots in the duration, the total
resource balance belongs to a fixed interval [I0, I1], where
I0 > 0 is sufficiently small and I1 > I0 is sufficiently large.6
(2) There may also be bounds placed on the resource balance
of the adversary.
We shall refer to the set of all resource pools satisfying these
restrictions as the possible resource pools, and in Section 3 we shall
define a protocol to be live if it is live for all possible resource pools.
The sized setting. For the sized setting, the total resource balance
T is a predetermined function T : D ×M → R≥0.
The basic idea is that PoS protocols will generally be best
modeled using the sized setting, while PoWprotocols are best mod-
eled using the unsized setting, since one does not know the total
resource balance (e.g., total hashrate in each timeslot) in advance.
There are some nuanced considerations, however. With a PoS pro-
tocol, for example, onemight not be able to predict accuratelywhat
percentage of the stake will actually come online and broadcast as
requested by the protocol. So there may be situations in which it
is appropriate to define the resource balance in terms of the online
or contributing stake, and where it should be recognised that only
partial information will be available concerning the total resource
balance. Equally, there may be contexts in which good bounds can
be given on the total resource balance over the duration for the
PoW case. The example of Bitcoin will be discussed further in Sec-
tion 6.
2.7 The permitter oracle
In order to specify how the resource pool is to be used, we shall
make use of the notion of a permitter oracle. This is the most crit-
ical part of the model, and is the part that blackboxes user selec-
tion, since it is the permitter oracle that grants permission to broad-
cast valid messages. The permitter oracle need not be implemented
6We consider resourcepools with range restricted to the fixed interval [I0, I1] because
it turns out to be an overly strong condition to require a protocol to be livewithout any
further conditions on the total resource balance, beyond the fact that it is a function
to R≥0 . We wish to be able to talk about Bitcoin as live in the unsized setting, for
example, but liveness will certainly fail if R is the constant 0 function, or if the total
resource balance decreases sufficiently quickly over time.
explicitly in the blockchain being modeled, and is a mathemati-
cal abstraction that allows for the discussion and comparison of
blockchains of very different types. It is designed to be as simple
as possible, subject to this goal.
As described in Section 2.2, we consider each user to be a com-
puting device with access to certain external oracles and function-
alities. At any given timeslot t ∈ D, a user’s state is entirely spec-
ified by the set of public keys they control, the protocol parame-
ters, their message state and the set of permissions they have been
given by the permitter oracle O. The protocol P = (I, O) is then
a pair, where the instruction set I is a set of deterministic and effi-
ciently computable instructions, which specifies precisely what ac-
tions honest users should carry out at each timeslot, as a function
of the timeslot and their state at that timeslot. The instructions of
the protocol are therefore a function of the timeslot, the keys con-
trolled by the user, the protocol parameters, their message state,
and the set of permissions they have been given by the permitter.
One of the external functionalities each user has is the ability to
broadcast valid messages. Amongst the conditions required for va-
lidity is that the public key responsible for the broadcast has been
given permission by the permitter oracle O, which is an oracle to
which users have access. We thus suppose that users can make ‘re-
quests’ to the permitter, of the form (U,M, t ′,A), where U is a public
key under their control,M is a possible downward closed message
state, t ′ is a timeslot, and where A is some (possibly empty) extra
data. Given a request of this form, the permitter may then respond
by giving them permission to broadcast certain messages. The re-
sponse of the permitter to a request (U,M, t ′,A)will be assumed to
be a probabilistic function of the protocol parameters, the actual
timeslot t , the previous requests made by U, the tuple (U,M, t ′,A),
and of the user’s resource level R(U, t ′,M).7
The conditions we have described above non-trivially restrict
what the permitter can do. For example, consider the unsized set-
ting, and suppose that the total resource pool (e.g., total hashrate)
cannot be deduced from the protocol parameters, t , previous re-
quests made by U, the tuple (U,M, t ′,A), and the user’s resource
level R(U, t ′,M). In this case, the framework requires that the re-
sponse of the permitter be independent of the total resource pool.
(Whereas in the sized setting, if the total resource pool can be
deduced from the broadcast state M , the permitter is not so con-
strained.)
As we shall discuss later, the form of the permission given by
the permitter might be permission to broadcast a specific message
(such as the data A proposed by the user in their request), or it
might be permission to broadcast any number of messages satis-
fying certain criteria (such as any block that extends the message
state at a given location). In what follows we shall consider various
settings, depending on what assumptions can be made about the
relationship between the permitter and the resource pool.
It should be noted that the roles of the resource pool and the
permitter are different in the sense that, while the resource pool is a
variable (meaning that a given protocol may be expected to be live
and secure with respect to a range of resource pools), the permitter
7Another way to interpret these conditions is that the response to a request (or the
probability distribution on that response) should be fully determined by information
known to the user making the request – in practice, users should be able to check for
themselves whether or not they have permission to broadcast.
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is part of the protocol description (meaning that a protocol is only
required to run relative to a specific permitter oracle).
2.8 Modeling simple PoW and PoS protocols
For concreteness, we next consider how some simple PoS and PoW
protocols can be modeled using our framework. In this section, we
will give a brief summary. Then in Appendix A, we give more in-
depth examples for Bitcoin and for a ‘generic’ longest chain PoS
protocol. We remind the reader that our goal is not to literally
model the step-by-step operation of these protocols, but rather
to replicate the essential properties of their user selection mech-
anisms with a suitable choice of a permitter oracle.
First, consider a PoW protocol like Bitcoin. To keep things sim-
ple, we’ll initially ignore Bitcoin’s adjustable ‘difficulty parameter’
(i.e., how hard the PoW is to produce); We’ll return to this point
in Section 6 and Appendix A. To model a simple PoW protocol of
this form, we can consider very short timeslots (say 1 second each,
or even shorter). The resource level (i.e., hashrate) of a user in a
given timeslot is independent of the message state, so we can re-
strict attention to resource pools R : U ×D → R≥0. We interpret
a user request (U,M, t ′,A) in a timeslot t as all of U’s efforts during
timeslot t to extend the message stateM .8 (If a user submits more
than one request during a timeslot, the permitter ignores all but
the first.) For example, we can interpret A as a choice and ordering
of transactions within a proposed block, along with a choice of pre-
decessor, with the understanding that the user will try as many dif-
ferent nonces as possible during the timeslot. The permitter then
gives U permission to broadcast with probability proportional to
R(U, t) (so long asA can be legally added toM).9 A notable feature
of this permitter is that permission is granted for the broadcast
of specific messages (i.e., a specific choice of A), rather than for a
collection of messages meeting certain criteria.
There are various ways in which ‘standard’ PoS selection pro-
cesses can work. Let us restrict ourselves, just for now and for the
purposes of this example, to considering protocols in which the
only broadcast messages are blocks, and let us consider a longest
chain PoS protocol which works as follows: For each broadcast
chain C and for all timeslots in a set T (C), the protocol being mod-
eled selects precisely one public key who is permitted to produce
blocks extendingC (i.e. blockswhose parent is the unique leaf ofC),
with the probability each public key is chosen being proportional
to their wealth as recorded in C .10 In order to model a protocol of
this form, we can consider a (timeslot-independent) resource pool
R : U × M → R≥0, which takes the longest chain C from M ,
and allocates to each public key U their wealth according to C .11
8The parameter t ′ is ignored by the permitter, or equivalently is automatically inter-
preted as the current timeslot t ; the parameter t ′ is relevant only for PoS protocols.
9For example, with probability R(U, t )/M , whereM is a large constant that depends
on the assumed maximum hashrate I1 and the timeslot length.
10Note that being permitted to broadcast a block is not the same as being instructed by
the protocol to broadcast a block, and does not determine how other users will treat
the block – there are many contexts in which users might be able to produce valid
blocks for which broadcast is not instructed by the protocol (e.g., a block extending a
chain other than the longest one). A user may also be permitted to produce two valid
blocks whose broadcast constitutes an overt deviation from the protocol, and which
might be punished.
11Note that in many PoS protocols the relevant balance is actually U’s wealth accord-
ing to some proper initial segment of C , and that in modeling such protocols one
should adjust R accordingly. As mentioned earlier, it is also standard to insist that
Then we can consider a permitter which chooses one public key
U for each chain C and each timeslot t ′ in T (C), each public key U
being chosen with probability R(U,C)/T (C). (This is well defined
because the total resource pool T is known to the protocol.) That
chosen public key U corresponding to C and t ′, is then given per-
mission to broadcast blocks extending C whenever U makes a re-
quest (U,M, t ′, ∅) for which C is the longest chain inM . A notable
feature of this permitter is that the permission it gives is for the
broadcast of sets of messages satisfying certain criteria, i.e. when
the permitter gives permission it is for any (otherwise valid) block
extending a given chain C .
To model a BFT PoS protocol, the basic approach will be very
similar to that described for the longest chain PoS protocol above,
except that certain other signed messages might be now required
in M (such as signed votes on blocks) before permission to broad-
cast is granted, and permissionmay now be given for the broadcast
of messages other than blocks (such as votes on blocks).
We refer the reader to Appendix A for two examples that are
described in greater detail.
3 ADAPTIVITY AND FINALITY
3.1 The extended protocol and the meaning of
probabilistic statements
In order to define what it means for a protocol to be secure or live,
we first need a notion of confirmation for blocks,which is a function
C mapping any message state to a chain which is a subset of that
message state, in a manner which depends on an initially defined
parameter called the security parameter ε ≥ 0. (E.g., in Bitcoin,
one might consider a block confirmed if six blocks follow it on
the longest chain; changing the “six” to some other number would
yield a different notion of confirmation.) The intuition behind ε is
that it should upper bound the probability of false confirmation.
Given any message state, C returns the set of confirmed blocks.
In Section 2.7, we stipulated that the protocol P = (I, O) is a
pair, where the instruction set I is a set of deterministic and effi-
ciently computable instructions specifying precisely what actions
an honest user should carry out at each timeslot, and where O is
the permitter. In general, however, a protocol might only be con-
sidered to run relative to a specific notion of confirmation C. We
will refer to the triple (I, O, C) as the extended protocol. Often we
shall suppress explicit mention of C, and assume it to be implicitly
attached to a given protocol. We shall talk about a protocol being
live, for example, when it is really the extended protocol to which
the definition applies.
Each execution of the extended protocol is then entirely deter-
mined by:
(1) The parameters;
(2) The set of users and their public keys;
(3) An index specifying the program executed by the adversary;
(4) The resource pool (whichmay ormay not be undetermined);
(5) The set of asynchronous timeslots;
U has been recorded as a public key with non-zero stake for a minimum number of
timeslots.
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(6) Certain events on which probability distributions are estab-
lished, including permitter responses and message delivery
times.
Generally, when we discuss an extended protocol,we shall do so
within the context of a setting, which constrains the set of possible
choices for (1)-(6) above. The setting might specify the probability
distribution on delivery times, for example, and might restrict the
set of resource pools to those in which the adversary is given a
limited resource balance. When we make a probabilistic statement
to the effect that a certain condition holds with at most/least a cer-
tain probability, this means that the probabilisitic bound holds for
all possible values of (1)-(5) above that are not made explicit in the
statement, and which are consistent with the setting.
3.2 Liveness and adaptivity
In order to define liveness for a protocol with a notion of confir-
mation C, let |C(M)| denote the number of blocks in C(M) for any
message state M . For a given U , and timeslots t1 < t2, let Mi be
U ’s message state at ti . Let us say that [t1, t2] is a growth interval
for U , if |C(M2)| > |C(M1)|.
Definition 3.1. A protocol is live if, for every choice of security
parameter ε > 0, there exists ℓε such that the following holds with
probability at least 1 − ε for any timeslots t1 < t2 ∈ D, and for any
userU : If t2−t1 ≥ ℓε and [t1, t2] is entirely synchronous, then [t1, t2]
is a growth interval for U .
So, roughly speaking, a protocol is live if the number of confirmed
blocks can be relied on to grow over time during synchronous
intervals of sufficient length. Note also, that while Definition 3.1
only refers explicitly to protocols, it is really the extended protocol
to which the definition applies. In order to properly understand
Definition 3.1, we refer the reader to the conventions concerning
the meaning of probabilistic assertions that were described in Sec-
tion 3.1. Generally, assertions of liveness and security will be made
within the confines of a particular setting, which might restrict the
probability distribution on message delivery times, or limit the re-
source balance of the adversary (but is otherwise worst-case sub-
ject to these constraints).
In order to digest Definition 3.1, it is useful to understand why
it should be satisfied by a protocol like Bitcoin. Suppose we model
Bitcoin in the unsized and synchronous setting. According to Sec-
tion 2.6, this means that we assume the existence of a fixed interval
[I0, I1] such that I0 > 0, I1 > I0, and such that the total resource bal-
ance always takes values in [I0, I1]. Let us suppose that we model
Bitcoin and the permitter as discussed in Section 2.8 – again, for
the sake of simplicity, we’ll forget about the fact that Bitcoinmakes
adjustments to the ‘difficulty’. Suppose also that, as part of the set-
ting, we assume:
(A) The adversary only ever controls a suitably small propor-
tion of the total resource balance, and;
(B) The probability distribution on the length of time for mes-
sage delivery is such that the probability of delivery failure
tends to 0 as the time after broadcast tends to∞.
In order for a block B to be confirmed, C requires that it should be-
long to the longest chain in M and be followed by x many blocks,
where the value of x is a function of the security parameter ε and
the assumed restriction on the adversary’s resource balance. Sup-
pose that, at a given timeslot t , C is the longest chain seen by U .
Since we assume that the total resource balance always belongs to
[I0, I1], this allows us to find ℓ∗ε (independent of t and C) such that
the following holds with probability > 1 − ε/2: Some honest user
with public key U′ is permitted to broadcast a new block at a times-
lot before t + ℓ∗ε , but after all blocks in C have been delivered to
them. In order to specify the value ℓϵ whose existence is required
by Defintion 3.1, we can then define ℓε > ℓ∗ε such that, with prob-
ability > 1 − ε/2, the block broadcast by U′ will be delivered to U
by timeslot t + ℓε . It then holds with probability > 1 − ε that the
longest chain (and hence the number of confirmed blocks) seen by
U at t + ℓε is of length greater than |C |.
Now that we have defined liveness, we can also define adaptiv-
ity:
Definition 3.2. We define a protocol to be adaptive if it is live in
the unsized setting.
3.3 Security and finality
Roughly speaking, security requires that confirmed blocksnormally
belong to the same chain. Let us say that two distinct blocks are
incompatible if neither is an ancestor of the other, and compatible
otherwise. If B ∈ C(M) where M is the message state of U at time
t , then we shall say that B is confirmed for U at t .
Definition 3.3. A protocol is secure if the following holds for ev-
ery choice of security parameter ε > 0, for every U1,U2 and for all
timeslots t1, t2 in the duration: With probability > 1 − ε , all blocks
which are confirmed forU1 at t1 are compatible with all those which
are confirmed for U2 at t2.
Definition 3.4. A protocol hasfinality if it is secure in the partially
synchronous setting.
Note that BFT protocols such as Algorand are normally designed
to have finality in this sense. For Algorand, the duration and adver-
sary resource bound are initially specified as parameters, and then
the protocol specifies committee sizes and other quantities so that
the probability two incompatible blocks will ever be confirmed is
less than ε .
4 THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ADAPTIVITY AND
FINALITY
In Section 2.7, we didn’t describe any conditions requiring that the
behaviour of the permittermust be influenced by the resource pool.
The only assumption of this kind thatwe shallmake is stated below,
and will be applied for both the sized and unsized settings.
No balance, no voice: No U will be given permis-
sion to broadcast messages in response to a request
(U,M, t ,A) for which R(U, t ,M) = 0.
Now that the framework and all required definitions are in place,
we can formally prove Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. No protocol is both adaptive and has finality.
As stated previously, this theorem can be seen as an analog of
theCAPTheorem [12] fromdistributed computing for our blockchain
protocol analysis framework. Now that we have formally defined
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adaptivity, finality, security, and liveness, it may be useful to say
a little more about the relationship to the CAP Theorem. While
the CAP Theorem asserts that (under the threat of unbounded net-
work partitions), no protocol can be both available and consistent,
it is possible for BFT protocols such as Algorand to be both live
and secure in the partially synchronous setting. This is possible be-
cause liveness is a fundamentally weaker property than availabil-
ity: Liveness does not require new confirmed blocks to be produced
during extended periods of asynchrony. For example, Algorand is
live, even though block production may stop during network par-
titions. The key idea behind the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that, in
the unsized (and partially synchronous) setting, this fundamental
difference disappears, with network partitions indistinguishable
from waning resource pools. Liveness then forces the existence
of growth intervals during network partitions. In the unsized and
partially synchronous setting, security and liveness thus become
incompatible, just as consistency and availability are incompatible
according to the CAP Theorem.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.1) The idea behind the proof can be summed
up as follows. We consider executions of the protocol in which
there are at least two users, both of which are honest, and who
control public keys U0 and U1 respectively. Suppose that, in an ex-
ecution of the protocol in the unsized and partially synchronous
setting, U0 and U1 both have the same constant and non-zero re-
source balance, and that all other users have resource balance zero
throughout the duration. According to the assumption ‘no balance,
no vote’, this means that U0 and U1 will be the only public keys
which are able to broadcast messages. For as long as the adversary
is able to prevent messages broadcast by each Ui from being deliv-
ered to U1−i (i ∈ {0, 1}), the execution will be indistinguishable,
as far as Ui is concerned, from one in which only Ui has the same
constant and non-zero resource balance. The fact that the proto-
col is live means that, with high probability, U0 and U1 will see
confirmed blocks within a bounded period of time. The confirmed
blocks for U0 will be incompatible with those for U1, so long as
these confirmed blocks appear before any point at which a mes-
sage broadcast by Ui has been delivered to U1−i for some i ∈ {0, 1}.
This contradicts security for the protocol in the partially synchro-
nous setting.
To describe the argument in more detail, let U0 and U1 be public
keys controlled by different honest users. For a durationD which
is sufficiently long, we consider three different resource pools:
R0 : We let R0 assign the constant value I > 0 to both U0 and U1
over the entire duration, while all other users are assigned
the constant value 0.
R1 : We letR1 assign the constant value I to U0 over the entire du-
ration, while all other users are assigned the constant value
0.
R2 : We letR2 assign the constant value I to U1 over the entire du-
ration, while all other users are assigned the constant value
0.
We consider three different executions of the protocol with the
same parameters, for the unsized setting in which the resource
pool is an undetermined variable:
Ex0 : Here R := R0. All timeslots are asynchronous and the ad-
versary prevents the delivery of messages broadcast by Ui
to the user controlling U1−i , for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Ex1 : Here R := R1, and we work in the synchronous setting (or
in the partially synchronous setting, but without interfer-
ence by the adversary).
Ex2 : Here R := R2, and we work in the synchronous setting.
According to the assumption of ‘no balance, no voice’, it follows
that only U0 and U1 will be able to broadcast messages in any of
these three executions. Our framework stipulates that the instruc-
tions of the protocol for a given user at a given timeslot must be a
deterministic function of the protocol parameters, the timeslot, the
keys controlled by the user, their message state and the set of per-
missions they have been given by the permitter (see Section 2.7).
It also stipulates that the response of the permitter to a request
(U,M, t ′,A) is a probabilistic function of the protocol parameters,
the actual timeslot t , previous requests made by U, the request
(U,M, t ′,A), and the user’s resource level R(U, t ′,M). It therefore
follows by induction on timeslots that, because the resource pool
is undetermined:
(†) For each i ∈ {0, 1}, and for all timeslots in Ex0, the probabil-
ity distribution on the state of the user controlling Ui is iden-
tical to the corresponding distribution at the same timeslot
in Ex1+i .
If the protocol is adaptive, then it follows from Definition 3.1 that
we can find a timeslot t0 satisfying the following condition: In both
Ex1+i (i ∈ {0, 1}), it holds with probability > 3/4 that there is at
least one block which is confirmed for Ui at t0. By (†) it then holds
for Ex0, and for each i ∈ {0, 1}, that with probability > 3/4 there
is at least one block which is confirmed for Ui at t0. We stipulated
in Section 2.4 that no block B can be broadcast by U := Miner(B) at
a point strictly prior to that at which its parent has been delivered
to U. It follows that in Ex0 all blocks which are confirmed for Ui
must be incompatible with all blocks which are confirmed for U1−i .
The definition of security therefore fails to hold for timeslot t0, and
with respect to the security parameter 1/2. 
5 PROOF-OF-STAKE REQUIRES
MULTI-PERMITTERS
One major difference between typical PoW and PoS longest-chain
protocols (e.g., Bitcoin vs. Snow White) is the order of operations
between a user choosing a proposed block to broadcast and learn-
ing whether or not it has permission to broadcast. In the dominant
PoW protocols, the proposed block is chosen first, and only then
is permission granted or denied; in typical longest-chain PoS pro-
tocols, permission (to broadcast in a given timeslot at a given lo-
cation) is granted before the specific block to broadcast is chosen.
Is this difference an artefact of the protocols developed thus far, or
is it a more fundamental distinction between PoW and non-PoW
protocols? We next use our framework to reason about this ques-
tion.
Already from the simple examples in Section 2.8, one can see
that the standard PoW and PoS protocols are best modeled by per-
mitters and resource pools with quite different properties. The per-
mitter which we described in modeling the PoS case, for example,
was able to ensure that a single user would be given permission to
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extend a particular chain at a particular timeslot, simply because it
has access to the total resource balance recorded by a given chain.
As alluded to above, another notable difference is that the permitter
we described for the PoW case gave permission for the broadcast
of specific messages, rather than for sets of messages satisfying cer-
tain criteria (and of size larger than 1). We shall refer to permitters
of this type as single-permitters, as opposed to multi-permitters.
A key factor in determining whether multi-permitting is inher-
ent to non-PoW protocols is the number of possible blocks extend-
ing a given chain C—by the ‘possible’ extensions of a chain C , we
mean those blocks B satisfying all conditions required for validity
other than being permitted by the permitter oracle. If the number
of possible extensions is large, while the probability that the per-
mitter gives permission for each is small, then a user may be able
to increase their probability of gaining permission to broadcast
a block by churning through as many requests as possible. This
means that the probability of success comes to depend on compu-
tational power, rendering the protocol (at least partially) PoW.
In order to see this more precisely, we need a precise way to talk
about the computational power of a user. So, for the purposes of
this discussion, let us say that the computational power of a user is
the number of requests they are capable of making to the permitter
in each timeslot. We’ll denote the computational power of U by XU.
In order to restrict to realistic scenarios, we’ll suppose that there
is some fixed upper bound Xmax, for which we always have XU ≤
Xmax. Suppose that, at a given timeslot t , C is the longest chain,
and, for the sake of simplicity, suppose thatC has been seen by all
users. Suppose further that the following conditions are satisfied:
(†1) The permitter O is a single-permitter. More specifically, letΛ
be the set of requests of the form (U,C, t ,B), such that B is a
possible extension of C . There exists some λ > 0, such that
O will respond to each distinct request in Λ made during
timeslot t , by giving permission to broadcast the specific
block B with independent probability λ · R(U, t ,C).
(†2) For some constant ExtNo, there are ExtNo many possible
extensions of C for each U. Each U submits min{XU, ExtNo}
many requests from Λ (and only those) during timeslot t .
Let pU be the probability that U is given permission to broadcast
during timeslot t . In what follows, it will simplify calculations to
consider what happens in the limit of the size of the network of
users: We shall say that a given condition holds in the limit, if it
holds so long as pU is sufficiently small for all U. We’ll say that one
quantityx is proportional to another quantityy in the limit, if there
exists some constant c such that, for each ϵ > 0, x/cy ∈ (1−ϵ, 1+ϵ)
in the limit.
Proposition 5.1 below says that, when the number of possible
extensions ExtNo is larger than Xmax, the single-permitter O au-
tomatically gives rise to a PoW protocol, since, in the limit, the
probability U is given permission to broadcast is then proportional
to U’s computational power. While Proposition 5.1 works accord-
ing to the specific assumption that the permitter responds to each
request with independent probability, it should be clear that the
basic principle holds under much more general conditions.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that (†1) and (†2) above are satisfied,
so that O is a single permitter, and each U submits min{XU, ExtNo}
many requests during timeslot t . Let pU be the probability that U is
given permission to broadcast during timeslot t . In the limit, pU is
proportional to R(U, t ,C) ·min{XU, ExtNo}.
Proof. Define YU := min{XU, ExtNo}, so that Umakes YU many
requests during timeslot t . If YU = 0 then pU = 0 and R(U, t ,C) ·
YU = 0. So suppose otherwise. Let λ be as defined in (†1). Then
the probability that at least one of the YU many requests made by
U results in permission to broadcast is 1 − (1 − λ · R(U, t ,C))YU . It
therefore suffices to show that:
1 − (1 − λ · R(U, t ,C))YU
λ · R(U, t ,C) · YU
→ 1 in the limit.
This can be shown with a straightforward analysis. Expanding out
(1 − λ · R(U, t ,C))YU :
(1 − λ · R(U, t ,C))YU = 1 − λ · R(U, t ,C) · YU +
1
2
YU(YU − 1)(λ · R(U, t ,C))
2 −
1
6
YU(YU − 1)(YU − 2)(λ · R(U, t ,C))
3
+ · · ·
We therefore have:
1 − (1 − λ · R(U, t ,C))YU
λ · R(U, t ,C) · YU
= 1 −
(YU − 1) · λ · R(U, t ,C)
2
+
(YU − 1)(YU − 2)(λ · R(U, t ,C))
2
6
+ · · · .
Now, since YU > 0, we have λ · R(U, t ,C) ≤ pU, so that λ · R(U, t ,C)
must tend to zero as pU tends to 0. Since YU is always less than
the fixed bound Xmax, the r.h.s. of (1) therefore tends to 1 in the
limit. 
In a standard PoS protocol, for example, one usually runs the
lotteries choosing users to produce blocks by having users hash
their public key, or some signed message, together with the times-
lot identifier and a frequently updated ‘random seed’. If the result-
ing hash (considered as a real number) is the lowest produced, or
if it is below a threshold that depends on their stake, then that user
might be allowed to produce the next block. If one wanted the per-
mission to broadcast to be block-specific, one could require users
to enter each proposed block as an extra input to the hash. Doing
so would mean that users who intend to produce blocks are now
incentivised to churn through many different possibilities for the
block as entry to the hash. So the resulting protocol becomes a
PoS/PoW hybrid.
In principle, however, and in situations where less possibilities
are required for each block, one certainly can envisage protocols
which use single-permitters, and which could be implemented us-
ing PoS. As a simplistic example, we might consider a protocol
which is aimed at recording the time of a particular event. At each
in a sequence of short timeslots, a single user might be selected
and given permission of one of two forms. Either:
(a) They are given permission to broadcast a block recording
that, “The event has happened by this timeslot”, or;
(b) They are given permission to broadcast a block recording
that, “The event is yet to take place”.
To ensure single-permitting, the parent of the block should also
be specified as part of the permission (e.g., with permission being
given for different parents in some rotating fashion). Honest users
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are then asked to broadcast the permitted block only in the case
that the information recorded by the block and all ancestors is cor-
rect. Such a protocol can be implemented using PoS, and the small
number of possibilities for each block means that one can do so
without degenerating into a PoW protocol.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Defining finality
The term ‘finality’ is sometimes used to mean the absolute guaran-
tee that blocks of transactions will not be revoked once committed
to the blockchain with a suitable level of confirmation.We have de-
fined a different (probabilistic) notion of finality, and have argued
that it can be effectively applied to the categorisation and analysis
of blockchain protocols. It may be instructive, however, to further
examine whether the former informal notion – let’s call it abso-
lute finality – is likely to be useful for the analysis of blockchain
protocols.
To make things concrete, let us consider the case of Algorand.
For the purposes of this discussion, all one needs to know about
Algorand is that block confirmation revolves around the selection
of committees, and that the protocol relies for its security on the
idea that an adversary with suitably bounded stake will never have
a committee majority.12 Under appropriate modeling assumptions,
one can show that the chance of the adversary gaining a committee
majority at any point during the predetermined duration of the
protocol is indeed negligible. Since the process of selecting users
to be committee members is probabilistic, however, it certainly is
possible that there will exist committees controlled entirely by the
adversary. At a given moment in time it could turn out to be the
case, even if onlywith negligible probability, that a number of prior
committees have actually had dishonest majorities, and are now
providing confirmation for an alternative blockchain. So Algorand
fails to have absolute finality as a simple consequence of the fact
that certain aspects of the process are best modeled as probabilistic.
The question then becomes, is it meaningful in a blockchain con-
text to worry about the distinction between an event which occurs
with probability which is essentially 0, and an event which holds
with probability exactly 0?While it might be possible for a commit-
tee to have a dishonest majority, how much does this matter if the
probability is < 10−10 that this occurs at any time during the execu-
tion of the protocol? We take the position that if a permissionless
protocol achieves absolute finality given appropriate modeling as-
sumptions (such as the security of elliptic curve cryptography, or
the fact that a given hash function is collision resistant), then it still
holds with non-zero probability that some aspect of the modeling
assumptions fails to hold. So the distinction is really a matter of
where one hides the probability of failure.
6.2 Does finality matter?
The extent to which protocol finality is important is an interesting
question. We have defined finality here so as to be most useful for
classification purposes. The notion of finality that we consider re-
quires being secure in the face of unbounded periods of network
12In fact, never more than a third of any given committee.
failure; one might argue that this is overkill in practice. For exam-
ple, one relaxation would require only that a protocol be secure in
the face of realistically bounded periods of network failure; this, in
turn, may allow for greater protocol adaptivity.
Let us explore this idea further in the context of Bitcoin. In Sec-
tion 2.8, we considered how to model a PoW protocol that was a
simplified version of Bitcoin, in the sense that we did not consider
the updates to the ‘difficulty parameter’ that are implemented ev-
ery couple of weeks in Bitcoin. Now that we have formally defined
security and adaptivity, we can consider in more detail what dif-
ferences are caused by these updates to the difficulty parameter. In
fact, Bitcoin is normally considered to be executed with a notion
of confirmation which is particularly insensitive to the difficulty
parameter – a block is considered confirmed once it belongs to the
longest chain and is followed by a fixed number of blocks (six be-
ing a common choice). According to this notion of confirmation,
network partitions of a few hours may suffice to produce a situa-
tion in which different blocks are confirmed for different users. If
one wants to avoid this, one response is to consider the same pro-
tocol paired with a notion of confirmation that requires blocks to
be produced at a certain rate. For example, one might consider a
block to be confirmed if it belongs to the longest chain and is fol-
lowed by x ≥ 6 many blocks, which have been produced in less
than x/5.5 many hours. The Bitcoin protocol with this notion of
confirmation is still adaptive, but the network partitioning attack
described in the proof of Theorem 4.1 would now have to be car-
ried out over a considerably extended interval of time. One might
argue that such extended network partitions are unlikely, and that,
realistically speaking, adaptivity (even if slow) is likely to be bene-
ficial in ensuring liveness.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our main aim in this paper has been to establish a framework for
analysing permissionless blockchain protocols that blackboxes the
precise mechanics of the user selection process. Establishing such
a framework allows us to prove impossibility results, and to iso-
late the properties of the selection process which are significant
in the sense that they impact the way in which the protocol must
be designed, or influence properties of the resulting protocol, such
as security in a range of settings. We have focussed on the differ-
ence between the sized and unsized settings, and have shown that
the choice of setting is intimately related to a fundamental trade-
off for cryptocurrency protocols: A protocol cannot deliver final-
ity for block confirmations while at the same time being adaptive.
The formal dichotomy which results can be seen as elucidating
the informal division of permissionless blockchain protocols into
those which are longest chain type protocols such as Bitcoin on
the one hand, and those protocols such as Algorand, Casper FFG
[5] or proof-of-stake (PoS) implementations of Tendermint or Hot-
stuff on the other, which work by importing traditional Byzantine-
Fault-Tolerant protocols from the permissioned to the permission-
less setting.
In the description of the framework presented here, explicit men-
tion was made of an adversary who displays byzantine behaviour.
The expectation is that properties of protocols are asserted modulo
the existence of a bounded adversary. So assertions of liveness and
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security are made in a setting with explicit bounds on the adver-
sary, and the requirement is that the protocol should behave well
irrespective of the behaviour of the adversary, within the given
bounds. This is an entirely standard form of analysis in the dis-
tributed computing literature. There is a general understanding in
the blockchain community, however, that in the blockchain setting
there is also the need for a deeper game-theoretic analysis, which
takes account of user incentives. It is not enough that the protocol
should performwell given arbitrary behaviour from the adversary.
Given arbitrary behaviour by the adversary, it should also be the
case that the instructions of the protocol constitute something like
a Nash equilibrium for the honest users. It would be interesting to
use and expand our framework in order to achieve impossibility
results along these lines.
As well as allowing for impossibility results, a benefit of our
framework may also be in providing some modularity for the de-
scription and analysis of protocols. For example, the description
of PoS protocols tends really to consist of two components. One
has to describe how lotteries are to be implemented securely, so as
to provide an appropriate mechanism for user selection, and then
one has to describe the protocol to be carried out by users who are
selected to update the state. Once a mechanism for orchestrating
lotteries has been agreed on (such as that used in Algorand), one
might then want to describe a range of protocols, which work very
differently from each other, but which use the same basic method
of user selection. Or one might want to describe a protocol that
uses the same method of user selection as Algorand, but which
could be updated to use another method of user selection should
something superior be developed later. Blackboxing the process of
user selection via the use of permitters may therefore allow for a
more modular description and analysis.
A further avenue for research would be to use the framework
we have described here to formalize another notable difference be-
tween protocols which are adaptive and protocols which have fi-
nality, which concerns the nature of ‘proof of confirmation’. For
BFT protocols, it will generally be the case that the very existence
of a certain set of signed objects may suffice to establish confirma-
tion with high probability. For example, in Algorand, the existence
of a block, together with an appropriate set of committee signa-
tures establishing consensus for inclusion of the block, is sufficient
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the block can be considered
confirmed. For Bitcoin and other adaptive protocols, on the other
hand, a user will only believe that a certain chain is the longest
until they are shown a longer chain. For the adaptive protocols, in
other words, one needs to see a user’s full message state in order
to know whether they consider a given block to be confirmed. For
protocols with finality, by contrast, certain sets of publications will
constitute proof of confirmation, simply by virtue of being a subset
of a user’s state. We suspect that there are interesting interactions
with the resource setting to be explored in this regard.
REFERENCES
[1] Iddo Bentov, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi. 2016. Snow White: Provably Secure
Proofs of Stake. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2016, 919 (2016).
[2] Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, and S Matthew
Weinberg. 2019. Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols. In
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. 459–
473.
[3] Ethan Buchman, Jae Kwon, and Zarko Milosevic. 2018. The latest gossip on BFT
consensus. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.04938 (2018).
[4] Vitalik Buterin. 2018. What is Ethereum? Ethereum Official webpage. Available:
http://www. ethdocs. org/en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum. html. Accessed
14 (2018).
[5] Vitalik Buterin and Virgil Griffith. 2017. Casper the friendly finality gadget.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.09437 (2017).
[6] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. 2002. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance and
proactive recovery. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) 20, 4 (2002),
398–461.
[7] Miguel Castro, Barbara Liskov, et al. 1999. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance.
In OSDI, Vol. 99. 173–186.
[8] Jing Chen and Silvio Micali. 2016. Algorand. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.01341
(2016).
[9] Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer. 2013. Information propagation in the
bitcoin network. In IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings. IEEE, 1–10.
[10] Cynthia Dwork, Nancy A. Lynch, and Larry Stockmeyer. 1988. Consensus in
the Presence of Partial Synchrony. J. ACM 35, 2 (1988), 288–323.
[11] Juan A. Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. 2015. The Bitcoin Back-
bone Protocol: Analysis and Applications. In Proceedings of EUROCRYPT. 281–
310. Revised, June 2020.
[12] Seth Gilbert and Nancy Lynch. 2002. Brewer’s conjecture and the feasibility
of consistent, available, partition-tolerant web services. Acm Sigact News 33, 2
(2002), 51–59.
[13] Lucianna Kiffer, Rajmohan Rajaraman, and abhi shelat. 2018. A better method
to analyze blockchain consistency. In ACM CCS 2018.
[14] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. 2019. The Byzantine gen-
erals problem. In Concurrency: the Works of Leslie Lamport. 203–226.
[15] Nancy A Lynch. 1996. Distributed algorithms. Elsevier.
[16] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2019. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Technical
Report. Manubot.
[17] Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman, and abhi shelat. 2016. Analysis of the Blockchain
Protocol in Asynchronous Networks. eprint.iacr.org/2016/454.
[18] Marshall Pease, Robert Shostak, and Leslie Lamport. 1980. Reaching agreement
in the presence of faults. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 27, 2 (1980), 228–234.
[19] Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar. 2015. Secure high-rate transaction pro-
cessing in Bitcoin. In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
507–âĂŞ527.
[20] Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar. 2015. Secure high-rate transaction pro-
cessing in bitcoin. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
Data Security. Springer, 507–527.
[21] Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K Reiter, Guy Golan Gueta, and Ittai Abra-
ham. 2018. Hotstuff: Bft consensus in the lens of blockchain. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.05069 (2018).
8 APPENDIX A – TWO MODELING
EXAMPLES
In Section 2.8 we already considered how to model PoW and PoS
protocols. The idea of this appendix is just to flesh those details out
a little. In particular, we previously ignored Bitcoin’s adjustable dif-
ficulty parameter, and we will now drop that simplifying assump-
tion.
8.1 Modeling Bitcoin
We will assume that the reader is entirely familiar with the Bit-
coin protocol, the conditions for block validity, and so on. In order
to decide how to model Bitcoin, we just have to specify how the
timeslots, the resource pool R and the permitter O are defined. We
consider these in order.
To model Bitcoin, we can use very short timeslots (say 1 second
each, or even shorter). The exact length of timeslots does not mat-
ter very much, but we will be assuming that each public key only
attempts to mine at most one block in each timeslot. So the shorter
timeslots are, the weaker this assumption becomes. We also want
timeslots to be sufficiently short that any given miner is unlikely
to produce a block in any single given timeslot. For the sake of con-
creteness, let us fix timeslots at 1 second each. Then defining the
resource pool R is also simple. The resource level (i.e., hashrate) of
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a user in a given timeslot is independent of the message state, so
we can restrict attention to resource poolsR : U×D → R≥0. The
value R(U, t) is the hashrate (i.e. hashes per second) of the public
key U during timeslot t , i.e. the number of hashes per second that
the userU , who controls the key U, executes in attempting to mine
a block with U specified as the miner.
Our main task is therefore to determine how the permitter func-
tions. As described in Section 2.8, we interpret a user request (U,M, t ,A)
made during timeslot t as all of U’s efforts during timeslot t to mine
a new block (or, rather, all of the efforts that the owner U makes
on behalf of the public key U). If U submits more than one request
during a timeslot, the permitter ignores all but the first. In order
for the permitter to give a positive response, we suppose that A
must be an otherwise valid13 block extending the longest chain in
M . If this condition is satisfied then the probability that the per-
mitter gives a positive response will depend on U’s hashrate, but
will also depend on the adjustable difficulty level. Wemodel the ad-
justable difficulty level with a real valued function p(M). So upon
receiving the request above, and when all other conditions for a
positive response that we have already listed are satisfied, O now
gives permission to broadcast A with probability:
min{p(M) · R(U, t), 1}.
In order to complete our description of the permitter, it therefore
remains to specify how p(M) is determined. Of course, this has
to work in essentially the same way as Bitcoin: p(M) will be the
last in a sequence of real number values p1,p2, . . . that is updated
every 2016 blocks along the longest chain in M . Recall that the
difficulty level is adjusted to try and maintain block production at
a rate of one block every 10 minutes (= 600 seconds) on average
and that, initially, the difficulty level in Bitcoin required a hash
ending with 32 zeros. So we start with p1 =
1
600·232
. Every 2016
blocks (working along the longest chain in M), a production time
Ti (in seconds) for the ith sequence of 2016 blocks is determined
from the block timestamps. Then, subject to certain caveats listed
below, we define:
pi+1 = pi ·
Ti
2016 × 600
.
The caveat to the definition of pi+1 above is that, to stop the dif-
ficulty level changing too quickly, Bitcoin specifies that pi+1 can
change by at most a factor 4 at a time, i.e. that pi+1 must belong
to [ 14pi , 4pi ]. So, in line with Bitcoin, if the definition of pi+1 above
gives a value x outside this interval [ 14pi , 4pi ], then we define pi+1
to be whichever of 14pi and 4pi is closest to x .
The reader may notice that the fixed interval [I0, I1], which is
described in Section 2.6 as being a significant part of the underly-
ing assumptions for the unsized setting, does not explicitly feature
in our description of the model for Bitcoin. The existence of this
interval does become significant, however, once one tries proving
liveness for the extended protocol.
13I.e., valid in all senses except that it has not yet been permitted for broadcast by O.
8.2 Modeling a ‘generic’ longest chain PoS
protocol
Rather than deal with the idiosyncrasies of any particular well
known PoS protocol, for the sake of simplicity we will consider
how to model a ‘generic’ longest chain PoS protocol, for which the
only broadcast messages are blocks. Since we already described
roughly how to model protocols of this form in Section 2.8, the
point of this section is just to examine in more detail how choices
in the protocol definition will be reflected in the model.
Most PoS protocols already consider explicit timeslots, and al-
low for the addition of one new block to the longest chain for each
timeslot. So we will consider a protocol which comes with explic-
itly defined timeslots of this form, and we will assume that each
block B comes with a corresponding timeslot t(B) – we will also
refer to t(B) as the timestamp for B. For the sake of concreteness
we will suppose that each timeslot is 30 seconds long. We assume
that, at each timeslot, the protocol directs honest users to try and
extend the longest chain. In order to determine our model, we are
left to specify how R and the permitter O should be defined.
First of all, let us consider R . Of course, the basic idea with a
PoS protocol is that the resource pool should reflect a public key’s
stake in the currency. In order to model a protocol of this form,
we can therefore consider a timeslot-independent resource pool
R : U × M → R≥0, which takes the longest chain CM from
M , and allocates to each public key U a resource balance which
is determined by the information recorded in CM . Precisely how
this resource balance should be determined from CM will, how-
ever, depend on the particular details of the protocol. Let t(CM )
be the timestamp of the leaf of CM . It is standard practice in PoS
protocols to require that, if a user is to produce a block which
extends CM , then they should have a non-zero stake in the cur-
rency at some timestamp t which is significantly less than t(CM ).
For the sake of concreteness, let us suppose that the protocol we
are modelling considers the relevant balance to be that at timeslot
t∗ := max{t(CM ) − 1 hour, 0}. Then we define R(U,M) to be U’s
stake at timeslot t∗ , as recorded in CM .
Next, let us consider the permitter O. Again, the precise details
as to how we define O will depend on the protocol being modeled.
It is fairly common for PoS protocols to specify that blocks can-
not have parents which are too much older than they are. So, for
the sake of concreteness, let us suppose that the protocol we are
modeling requires that each block B must have a parent whose
timestamp is at most an hour earlier than t(B) in order to be valid.
Define T (CM ) := {t | t ∈ (t(CM ), t(CM ) + 1 hour]}. Let us sup-
pose that, for each t ∈ T (CM ), the protocol being modeled selects
precisely one public key who is permitted to produce blocks ex-
tending CM (i.e. blocks whose parent is the unique leaf of C and
with timestamp t ), with the probability each public key U is cho-
sen being proportional to R(U,M). In this case, we can simply con-
sider a permitter which chooses one public key U for each chain
C and each timeslot t ∈ T (C), each public key U being chosen
with probability R(U,C)/T (C). This is permissable because the to-
tal resource poolT is a predetermined variable. That chosen public
key U corresponding toC and t , is then given permission to broad-
cast blocks extendingC whenever Umakes a request (U,M, t , ∅) for
which C = CM , i.e., for which C is the longest chain in M .
